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The role of credit ratings in influencing capital structure decisions has generated a lot of 
discussion. This thesis intends to examine whether credit ratings directly impact the marginal 
financing behaviors of U.S. firms. Kisgen (2006) engaged in an earlier seminal discussion of 
this topic. His arguments on the discrete costs associated with credit rating levels suggest that 
firms near a credit rating change issue less debt relative to equity than firms farther away from 
a rating change. This concept became henceforth known as the Credit Rating-Capital Structure 
(CR-CS) hypothesis. Through the empirical analysis of 14,037 firm-years between 2001 and 
2017, our work confirms Kisgen’s (2006) findings that firms with a plus or minus rating have 
a propensity to use less debt relative to equity, than firms in the middle, supporting the CR-CS 
hypothesis. However, this significance seems to be mainly driven by the minus designation. 
Therefore, firms with an upgrade potential do not appear to significantly adjust their debt 
issuing patterns. Moreover, we confirm that firms are typically most concerned about broad 
rating levels, in which the access to the commercial paper is affected. Lastly, we find that credit 
ratings have a significant effect on capital structures, both during and prior to the financial crisis 
periods. Overall, we provide evidence that the potential costs of downgrades directly impact 
capital structure decisions, and managers are thus likely to be concerned with ratings-triggered 
costs.  
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O papel que o rating de crédito tem nas decisões da estrutura de capitais das empresas tem 
gerado uma larga discussão. Esta tese analisa em que medida o rating influencia diretamente a 
escolha da estrutura de capitais das empresas norte americanas. Kisgen (2006), estreia-se neste 
campo de análise desenvolvendo a hipótese CR-CS. O autor afirma que, devido à existência de 
custos associados aos níveis de rating, as empresas próximas de uma variação de rating tendem 
a emitir menos dívida relativamente a capitais próprios, face a empresas que não estão próximas 
desta variação. Através de uma análise empírica de 14,037 empresas-anos entre 2001 e 2017, 
confirmamos os resultados de Kisgen (2006) de que, empresas com um mais ou um menos no 
seu rating, têm uma menor propensão para usar dívida face a capitais próprios, do que aquelas 
que não estão em vias de sofrer alteração, suportando a hipótese CR-CS. Contudo, a 
significância destes testes parece estar maioritariamente associada ao coeficiente com um 
menos no seu rating. Deste modo, empresas com um potencial de upgrade tendem a não ajustar 
os seus padrões de emissão de dívida. Confirmamos, também, que as empresas preocupam-se 
principalmente com níveis de rating cujo acesso ao mercado do papel comercial está em causa. 
Por fim, validamos a hipótese CR-CS nos períodos pré-crise e crise financeira. Em geral, os 
resultados sugerem que os custos implícitos numa descida do rating impactam diretamente as 
decisões de estrutura de capital, facto que se afigura como fator de preocupação acrescido para 
os gestores. 
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Credit ratings have become a broadly accepted and relevant metric for assessing the 
creditworthiness of a given firm in the financial markets. Managers seemingly acknowledge the 
importance of credit ratings and therefore consider such metrics when making capital structure 
decisions. For instance, an April 2019 survey from Bank of America Merrill Lynch reported 
that “more than 40% of stock-market fund managers wanted companies to use leftover cash to 
pay down debt” in order to avoid a credit rating downgrade. The way credit ratings affect capital 
structures has not always been this significant, however. Kisgen (2006) ’s findings marked a 
watershed moment, with several managers subsequently recognizing that ratings impose 
frictions. Since then, a large body of literature has emerged on the relationship between credit 
ratings and firms’ capital structure policies.  
There is little consensus on whether credit ratings play a meaningful economic role in 
influencing capital structure decisions. Some authors provide evidence that it positively impacts 
the capital structure decisions(e.g., Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2009; Tang, 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 
2010; Kemper and Rao, 2013), whereas some literature neglects credit ratings as a determining 
factor (e.g., Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal, 2008; González and González, 2008; Fan, Titman, 
and Twite, 2012). Such disagreements within this field motivated us to investigate whether 
credit ratings impact the capital structure policies of US firms in contemporary settings.  
Kisgen (2006) provides a first examination of this topic, arguing that each credit rating level 
has an inherent discrete cost. Consistent with this assertation, he demonstrates that firms with 
either an upgrade or a downgrade potential will on average select more equity relative to debt, 
than firms farther away from a change in rating. Regardless of whether they do so to benefit 
from a potential upgrade or to avoid the additional costs of a potential downgrade, this 
mechanism is henceforth as the Credit Rating-Capital Structure hypothesis.  
The empirical tests we performed in our thesis build upon Kisgen (2006) ’s earlier work. We 
undertook to examine over a set timeframe, whether capital structure decisions are directly 
affected by ratings concerns. This was done by regressing measures of debt net of equity 
issuance on dummy variables which capture a firm’s proximity to a potential change in credit 
rating, while integrating controls for firm-specific factors. We constructed two different 
measures to distinguish between firms with an upgrade or downgrade potential versus those 
less likely to see any change in their ratings. This was done in order to address concerns of a 
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potential change in broad rating or a potential change of any kind. Our empirical tests were 
further modified through the application of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tests, for the added 
assessment of the validity of the CR-CS hypothesis within the wider context of the trade-off 
and pecking order theories. 
Through an empirical analysis of 14,037 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2017, we 
confirm Kisgen’s (2006) findings that firms with a plus or minus designation have a propensity 
to rely on less debt relative to equity, thereby supporting the CR-CS hypothesis. However, and 
conversely to Kisgen (2006), when firms are ranked within each micro rating into higher thirds, 
middle thirds, and lower thirds based on factors controlling for firm´s creditworthiness, the CR-
CS hypothesis does not hold. Therefore, our empirical tests are only statistically significant 
when considering POM tests, with firms near a change in credit rating issuing approximately 
0.3% less debt relative to equity as a percentage of total assets per year, than firms farther away 
from a change in rating. However, the significance of the POM coefficient is seemingly driven 
by its minus designation. Therefore, firms with an upgrade potential do not appear to 
significantly adjust their debt issuing patterns, while those that find themselves nearing a 
downgrade demonstrate increased propensity for such adjustments. As a robustness check, we 
included financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), albeit their inclusion had virtually no impact 
on our results.  Furthermore, we find that credit ratings have significant effects on capital 
structures, both during and prior to the financial crisis periods. During the financial crisis 
period, the impact of credit ratings on capital structure decisions was 0.20% points larger than 
during pre-crisis period. Finally, and conversely to Kisgen (2006)’s findings, we are unable to 
assess whether the CR-CS hypothesis can be utilized as a complement to such theories, as the 
pecking order and trade-off theories are violated within our sample.  
Our overall results suggest that the potential costs of downgrades directly impact capital 
structure decisions. Kemper and Rao (2013)’s findings are not only similar to ours, the 
magnitude of the impact of credit ratings on capital structure decisions presented in their work 
also match our own. For instance, Kemper and Rao (2013) finds that firms near a ratings 
downgrade issue 0.3% less debt relative to equity. This is somehow contradictory to Kisgen 
(2006) who purports instead that the potential benefits of upgrades also have a direct impact on 
capital structure decisions, with the effects found in his results also being significantly larger in 
magnitude. His work suggests that firms near a change in credit rating issue approximately 1% 
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less net debt of equity as a percentage of total assets each year, than firms farther from a change 
in rating.  
This thesis contributes towards the theoretical and empirical capital structure decision 
frameworks by examining whether the CR-CS hypothesis holds within a more recent sample 
period, while also comparing the impact of credit rating effects on capital structure decisions in 
the pre-financial crisis, financial crisis and post-financial crisis periods.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the most 
relevant literature addressing the influence of credit ratings on capital structure decisions, along 
with that on credit ratings concerns in the context of existing capital structure theories. Section 
3 describes our methodology, its benefits and its potential shortcomings and limitations. Section 
4 provides further insight and information on the data, the construction, of necessary variables, 
and descriptive statistics we relied upon. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 focus on the empirical results of 
our analysis on the impact of credit ratings on capital structure decisions and the way credit 
ratings complement traditional capital structure theories. Section 9 contains our conclusion, 
finalized insights and suggestions for future work. Finally, sections 10 and 11 provide all 
references and appendices respectively, utilized throughout the course of this thesis 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Influence of Credit Ratings for Capital Structure policy 
The means through which credit ratings affect capital structure policy has gained relevance over 
the last few decades within the field of empirical corporate finance research. Since the 1990´s, 
several corporate finance textbooks have come to acknowledge that credit ratings may influence 
capital structure decisions (e.g., Damodaran, 1997; Brigham, Gapenski and Ehrhardt, 1999; 
Moyer et al, 2012), only recent a formal investigation was performed. Graham and Harvey 
(2001)’s survey was the first to provide concrete evidence purporting that managers should 
focus on their credit ratings when making capital structure choices, reporting that 57.1% of 
CFOs considered credit ratings an important metric when deciding on a firm´s capital structure. 
Their survey further determined that credit ratings were the second most significant factor 
overall, affecting debt policy. Servaes and Tufano (2006) on the other hand, concluded that for 
most CFOs, the current credit rating level is the most important factor (out of 20 distinct factors) 
in determining a company’s level of debt.  
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Kisgen (2006), motivated by Graham and Harvey (2001), performed a formal analysis on 
whether capital structure policy is directly affected by ratings concerns. His paper argues that 
“credit ratings are a material consideration in managers’ capital structure decisions due to the 
discrete costs (benefits) associated with different rating levels” (Kisgen, 2006, p.1037). Since 
the publication of this seminal work, Kisgen’s main theoretical proposal is well known and 
referred to in the existing literature as the Credit Rating- Capital Structure Hypothesis, or simply 
CR-CS. This hypothesis states that firms with an upgrade or a downgrade potential will, on 
average, select more equity relative to debt compared to firms not near a change in rating. This 
is done in the hopes of benefitting from a potential upgrade, or to avoid the additional costs of 
a potential downgrade.  
The empirical tests required to evaluate the CR-CS hypothesis encompass both concern over 
Broad Ratings, using Plus or Minus tests (POM tests), and a concern over a potential change of 
any kind, using a Credit Score test. The plus and minus terms used in the POM tests serve to 
identify that the firm is on the edge of a rating change. Within the Credit Score tests, firms must 
be categorized for analysis. A credit value is assigned to each firm, separating them into high, 
middle and low thirds, with firms within the low and high third considered to be on the verge 
of a ratings change. The results, according to the CR-CS hypothesis, implies that both types of 
tests should confirm that firms on the verge of a rating change will be reluctant to issue debt 
when compared to firms that are in the middle of a broad rating.  
The CR-CS hypothesis is distinct from financial distress theories. Firstly, financial distress 
arguments and debates go back to the beginnings of the 60´s, following the pioneer research of 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), and Altman et al (1977), and their demonstrations that financial 
variables are correlated with bankruptcy. The CR-CS hypothesis has only recent been 
introduced by Kisgen (2006). Secondly, CR-CS suggests that firms on the verge of a rating 
change will on average, issue less debt than their counterpart firms, while according to financial 
distress arguments, firm on the edge of a potential upgrade will tend to issue more debt since 
its credit quality is better. Moreover, CR-CS implies that credit ratings have an impact at all 
rating levels, whereas distress concerns are unlikely to be significant for firms with high ratings. 
Furthermore, according to Kisgen (2006), CR-CS entails discrete costs (benefits) whenever 
there is a change in rating, therefore suggesting a lack of continuity in the relationship between 
a firm’s leverage and its value. However, financial distress arguments suggest no such lack of 
continuity.  
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In some cases, financial distress and CR-CS hypothesis possess some similarities, to the extent 
that Kisgen (2006) includes variables within his work to control for the financial condition of a 
firm, in order to capture a credit rating’s effect without contaminating the results with any 
potential financial distress effects. Conversely, Kemper and Rao (2013) question this distinction 
between the CR-CS hypothesis and financial distress concerns. They suggest instead that the 
propensity of B- rated firms to issue debt might be a simple reflection of their financial distress, 
and thus an indication of their inability to raise more debt. This in contrast to the suggestion 
that such a reduction in debt is a conscious choice.   
Following on Kisgen (2006)’s footsteps, a large body of literature has looked into the 
relationship between credit ratings and a firm´s capital structure policy in the US (e.g., Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; Kisgen, 2009; Tang, 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010; Byoun, 2011; Faulkender 
et al, 2012; Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2018), and more recently in Europe (e.g., Hung, 
Banerjee, and Meng, 2017;  Wojewodzki, Poon and Shen, 2018).  
Kisgen (2006)’s work constitutes a landmark in theoretical and empirical capital structure 
policy frameworks.  
2.2. Credit Ratings in the Context of Capital Structure Theories 
Kisgen (2006) also further developed the CR-CS hypothesis within the context of trade-off and 
pecking order theories. According to the author, the effects of ratings on capital structure can 
be seen to complement to existing capital structure theories. He purports that each credit rating 
level is associated with discrete costs and benefits. When such costs (benefits) are materialized, 
managers will be confronted by the trade-off between these costs (benefits) against more 
traditional costs and benefits implied by existing theories, and will subsequently try to balance 
between them. Moreover, his work suggests that managers will not always behave according to 
the existing capital structure theories, particularly when costs (benefits) imposed by credit 
ratings dominate those inherent to increased leverage. These results find confirmation in other 
empirical studies (e.g., Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005; Najjara and Elgammal, 2013) and surveys 
(Graham and Harvey 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Servaes and Tufano, 2006). According 
to Wojewodzki, Poon and Shen (2018), such dominance of discrete costs imposed by credit 
ratings when compared to traditional costs, might explain why high-quality companies tend to 
be under-levered, while poor-quality firms are typically over-levered.  
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2.2.1 Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1977; Kim, 1978) states that the 
capital structure of a firm is chosen based on the idea of achieving an optimal level of debt. A 
firm´s optimal amount of leverage is reached by balancing the advantages of interest tax shields 
and other benefits of debt, against both direct and indirect costs of financial distress (Modigliani 
and Miller,1963), along with several agency costs (e.g., Jensen, 1986).  According to the trade-
off theory, a firm will return over time toward its optimum amount of leverage, despite possible 
natural or unexpected variance (see e.g., Fama and French, 2002). Conversely, in the presence 
of frictions, Strebulaev (2007) suggests that firms rarely adjust their capital structure. A firm´s 
choice of debt in a dynamic economy is thus likely to differ from the optimal level implicit in 
the trade-off theory. Strebulaev (2007) admits that traditional trade-off theory may fail to 
explain differences between firms within a statistical sample since actual and optimal leverage 
differ. Nevertheless, the theory finds its use with several firms and Kisgen (2006) addresses the 
importance of credit ratings in the context of trade-off theory. 
According to the CR-CS hypothesis, each credit rating level is associated with discrete costs 
(benefits). Managers will ponder these CR-CS costs (benefits), whenever they are materialized, 
against the traditional costs and benefits inherent to trade-off theory, resulting in capital 
structure behavior that is typically different from that considered by the traditional trade-off 
theory. Kisgen (2006) distinguishes between two cases, one in which the trade-off theory 
factors outweigh credit rating considerations, and another where costs and benefits linked to 
credit ratings outweigh those of increased leverage.  In this latter case, managers will not behave 
in a manner predicted by trade-off theory.  
2.2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking-order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), states that firms prefer not 
to issue equity due to asymmetric information availability between managers and investors. 
Firms will typically opt to fund projects with internal funds first, and debt second. Only when 
internal funds are no longer available and debt capacity has been reached, will a firm issue 
equity as a last resort.  
CR-CS suggests that whenever there is an incremental change in leverage, firms will experience 
a discrete cost (benefit) due to a potential change in their credit rating level. As such, for a given 
level of debt and assuming both CR-CS and pecking order effects are materialized, a firm will 
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balance the costs of issuing equity against the discrete costs associated with a potential change 
in credit rating. The trade-off between these costs is typically stronger for firms that are near a 
change in rating, regardless of whether such a change would result in an upgrade or downgrade. 
Therefore, the pecking order theory may be violated in some of these cases, since firms that are 
near an upgrade may choose to issue equity rather than debt, for the purposes of obtaining the 
additional benefits that arise from an increase in rating level. Conversely, firms that are near a 
downgrade may avoid issuing debt to mitigate the additional costs that arise from a potential 
decline in their credit rating. 
3. Methodology 
The primary testable implication, developed initially by Kisgen (2006) as the CR-CS 
hypothesis, suggests that a firm close to a credit rating change will typically issue less debt 
comparative to equity to either avoid a downgrade, or to benefit from a potential upgrade. The 
methodology followed here is an adaptation of Kisgen (2006).  
We examine the direct impact of rating concerns on capital structure decisions, through 
measures of regression on the debt net of equity issuance on dummy variables which capture a 
firm’s proximity to changes in its credit rating. Our empirical tests address two types of concern 
regarding changes in credit ratings: a rating change from one broad rating category to another, 
such as a firm going from BBB to A, and a rating change of any kind. Firms at the edge of a 
broad rating category are assigned a plus or minus designation, within the broad rating. The 
broad rating of BBB for instance, refers to BBB-, BBB and BBB+ firms, and of these only 
BBB- and BBB+ firms are considered to be at the edge of a broad rating level.  
The tests addressing the broad rating concerns are designated as POM tests (Plus or Minus 
tests). These tests use either a combined dummy variable (POM), or one that is decomposed 
into plus and minus categories separately (plus, minus). The main challenge of POM tests is to 
obtain precision in reflecting a firm’s proximity to a change in rating as plus and minus 
designations might be too vague, thereby reducing the accuracy of tests applied to them. For 
instance, a strong BB- may not be near a downgrade and analogous, a weak BB+ may not be 
near an upgrade. In these cases, resulting coefficients are typically biased, and thus 
underestimate true and accurate effects. 
Conversely, firms worried with credit rating effects at all ratings changes are ranked within 
each micro rating into a high third, middle third, and low third according to their respective 
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Altman´s Z-Score. The Altman´s Z-Score is the first model that allows one to predict defaults 
from five accounting ratios (Altman´s Z-Score is detailed in the credit score section) through a 
discriminant analysis. Each firm has a Z-Score value calculated and assigned to it, with firms 
in the low and high third of its correspondent micro rating considered to be near a change in 
rating. Tests addressing these micro rating challenges are designated as Credit Score tests. Such 
tests rely on either a combined dummy variable (HOL), or one that is decomposed into high 
and low categories separately (high, low). When considering the fact that the majority of a 
Credit Score is inherently noise, these tests may in some cases return a power reduction.  
In addition, other variables were included in the analysis with the aim of controlling for firm 
specific factors: leverage, profitability and size.  
Furthermore, the empirical tests described above are adapted to assess both the validity of CR-
CS hypothesis within the context of the trade-off and pecking order theories, thorough the 
application of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tests.  
Nevertheless, numerous problems may arise when applying either tests.  A complicating issue 
occurs when a firm’s credit rating changes during the year under study, as credit rating measures 
are defined at the beginning of each year. Moreover, when issuing debt and equity, material 
transaction costs rise, and subsequently capital structure changes can become sporadic and 
lumpy. On top of that, processes of capital structure transactions are highly time consuming, 
and consequently too slow for the typically swift decision time required. Such factors might 
lead to a bias estimation coefficient (generally an underestimation of the true effect). Another 
potential problem that could affect our empirical tests is related to the simultaneity between 
credit ratings and debt. Rating agencies assess firms’ creditworthiness by taking a firm´s 
leverage into account. The higher the company´s debt, the higher the probability of default, and 
when credit ratings are taken as proxies for default probability, the lower the credit rating. 
However, a higher rated firm, would possess a lower cost of debt financing, and thus in the 
future would usually have an incentive to increase leverage. 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our sample comprises all U.S. firms with a Compustat credit rating. The Compustat credit 
rating measure used is the beginning of year Standard & Poor´s Long-Term Domestic Issuer 
Credit Rating. According to Standard and Poor´s (2001b, p.61), this metric is the firm´s 
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“corporate credit rating”, which is itself a “current opinion on an issuer´s overall capacity to 
pay its financial obligations”.  
The main analysis is an adaptation of Kisgen (2006), we thus made a decision to update the 
time frame used, in order to validate his findings with contemporary up-to-date information. 
Hence, the sample period begins in 2001 and ends in 2017.  
We excluded firms with missing data in the fields regularly required for our empirical tests 
(these includes credit ratings, total assets, debt, and equity). Furthermore, our empirical tests 
excluded both very large debt and equity offerings, and solely large debt offerings only (defined 
as greater than 10% of assets). For extreme levels of debt offering, practically any firm might 
expect a downgrade. When considering small-medium debt offerings however, a firm close to 
a downgrade might see a deterioration in its rating, whereas it would not see such a downgrade 
were it originally farther from a credit change. Moreover, large offerings are generally 
associated with acquisitions, changes in management and reorganizations. In such contexts it is 
less likely that credit rating frictions will be relevant. The inclusion of financial firms and 
utilities have been controversial for years throughout the literature. Some authors (e.g., Fama 
and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2014) exclude both 
financial and utility firms (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999, respectively) while other, 
more recent ones, exclude only financial firms (e.g., Wojewodzki, Poon and Shen, 2018 and 
Almeida et al, 2017). Kisgen (2006), on the other hand, includes both types of firms, due to the 
fact that discrete costs associated with changes in rating levels are also likely to affect either 
kind of company. Following recent literature in this field, our sample excludes financial firms 
(SIC code 4000-4999), due to the significantly different nature of their liabilities. Our work 
nevertheless demonstrates robustness to the inclusion of both financial and utility firms.  
Below is presented the definition of the most common used variables in the empirical tests:  
Dit = book short-term debt plus book long-term debt for firm i at time t. 
DDit = long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt for 
firm i from time t to t+1. 
DLTDit = long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction for firm i from time t to t+1. 
Eit = book value of shareholders´ equity for firm i at time t. 
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DEit = sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock for 
firm i from time t to t +1. 
Ait = total assets for firm i at time t. 
CRPlus = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that have a plus credit rating at the beginning of 
time t (equal to 0, otherwise). 
CRMinus = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that have a minus credit rating at the beginning 
of time t (equal to 0, otherwise). 
CRPOM = CRPlus + CRMinus = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that have a minus or a plus 
credit rating at the beginning of time t (equal to 0, otherwise). 
CRHigh = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that are in the top third of their micro rating, 
regarding their credit score at the beginning of time t (equal to 0, otherwise). 
CRLow = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that are in the bottom third of their micro rating, 
regarding their credit score at the beginning of time t (equal to 0, otherwise). 
CRHOL = CRHigh + CRLow = dummy variable (equal to 1) for firms that are in the top third or 
bottom third of their micro rating, regarding their credit score at the beginning of time t (equal 
to 0, otherwise). 
Kit = set of control variables: leverage Di,t-1/(Di,t-1 + Ei, t-1), profitability EBITDAi,t-1/ Ai,t-1, and 
size ln(Salesi,t-1).  
NetDIssit = ( DDit - DEit) / Ait. 
Tables I and II illustrate summary statistics for our sample. Table I indicates the number of 
firm-years by credit rating while also presenting statistics for debt to total capitalization by 
rating. Table II shows the number of firms according to capital raising and reducing activity. 
Our sample is comprised of 14,037 firm-years.  
The uniform distribution is mostly absent from our sample. Ranges vary from 57 AA+ firm-
years to 1,819 BBB firm-years. Nevertheless, 11 out of 17 rating categories comprise over 700 
firm-years. The small sample of A and CCC+ or below rated firms can unfortunately lead to 
misleading coefficients when performing empirical tests by rating categories. As such we will 
undertake caution in inferring meaning onto the results for these groups.  
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Table I: Leverage by rating- Summary statistics 
Means, medians and standard deviations of Leverage, debt/ (debt + equity), by rating across firm-years 
and number of firms- years from 2001 to 2017. The sample comprises 14,037 firm-years and consists 
in all Compustat firms with a credit rating at the beginning of the year, excluding financial firms (SIC 
code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required (these include credit 
ratings, total assets, debt and equity) and firms with leverage ratio greater than 1 or less than 0. Leverage 
is book short-term plus long-term debt divided by book short-term plus long-term debt plus book value 
of shareholder´s equity.  
 
Credit ratings are considered a proxy of a company´s probability of default, as such the higher 
a firm´s credit rating the lower the probability of default. Therefore, the higher a firm´s leverage 
the higher the probability of default, and thus the lower the rating assigned to that specific firm, 
ceteris paribus.  The implication of this mechanism can be viewed in Table I, with debt to total 
capitalization ratio, henceforth leverage ratio, behaving as expected in its relationship with 
credit ratings. A or above rated firms present a median leverage ratio ranging from 23% to 39% 
(excluding AA- rated firms whereas its median leverage ratio is 56.1%). BBB and BB rated 
firms experience a median leverage ratio ranging from 41% to 51%. B or below rated firms 
possess a leverage ratio comprehended between 59% to 64%. It appears that while a negative 
 AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A 
Number of firm-Years 148 57 185 397 744 1,151 
Debt/(Debt+Equity)       
    Mean 37.3% 39.1% 45.7% 53.4% 42.9% 43.7% 
    Median 24.5% 22.7% 38.7% 56.1% 37.6% 38.6% 
    Std. Dev. 31.8% 34.9% 23.6% 26.1% 24.8% 25.9% 
       
 A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB 
Number of firm-Years 1,085 1,404 1,819 1,521 869 1,115 
Debt/(Debt+Equity)       
    Mean 40.4% 41.8% 42.9% 42.3% 45.5% 46.4% 
    Median 36.8% 40.7% 41.6% 40.9% 44.5% 45.3% 
    Std. Dev. 21.0% 19.2% 19.6% 20.5% 21.7% 19.8% 
 BB- B+ B B- CCC+ or Below 
Number of firm-Years 1,246 1.082 709 302 203 
Debt/(Debt+Equity)      
    Mean 50.4% 57.6% 60.8% 61.6% 56.7% 
    Median 50.9% 58.8% 64.0% 63.6% 61.54% 
    Std. Dev. 22.0% 22.4% 23.8% 23.2% 25.3% 
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relation between rating and leverage exists, the leverage ratio´s variance by rating category is 
relatively high, allowing for significant differences within each rating. 
Table II: Capital Activity- Summary statistics 
Number of firm-years by capital activity (debt only, equity only, both debt and equity, neither) from 
2001 to 2017. The sample comprises 14,037 firm-years and consists in all Compustat firms with a credit 
rating at the beginning of the year, excluding financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with 
missing data in the fields regularly required (these include credit ratings, total assets, debt and equity). 
A debt or equity offering, or reduction is defined as the net amount raised or reduced equal to or greater 
than 1% of total assets for the calendar year.  
 
Within capital offerings and defining an offering as a net amount greater than 1% of total assets, 
nearly 50% of firm-years issue only debt, with 8% raising only equity, leaving approximately 
30% of the firm-years with no offerings and 14% issuing both debt and equity. When 
considering capital reductions, the pattern remains similar, with nearly 50% of firm-years 
reducing only debt levels, compared to around 12% reducing only equity levels. The 
simultaneous reduction of debt and equity levels is approximately 7% points higher compared 
to an offering of the same nature, leaving, around 20% of firm-years with no reductions.  
Table II illustrates that throughout a given year, the most common means for a firm to finance 
itself is by using only debt. For instance, in the specific case of an offering, 70% of the firm-
years issue only debt. Conversely, only 11% of firm-years are comprised of solely equity 
issuances. Equity offerings involve larger transaction costs (Lee et al, 1996), and thereby occur 
less often. On the other hand, according to Kisgen (2006)’s analysis, the truly less common 
form of financing is the simultaneous use of debt and equity. In order to undertake a robustness 
check on whether this change in pattern is related with different time frames used, rather than 
with the lack of accuracy of the variables, we applied Kisgen (2006)’s time frame to our model. 
In concurrence with the author, the stake of firms issuing both equity and debt was reduced by 
more than a half in our subsequent analysis. A potential phenomenon driving this change in 
 Offerings  Reductions 
 # %  # % 
Debt Only 7,078 50.4%  6,697 47.7% 
Equity Only 1,152 8.2%  1,662 11.8% 
Debt and Equity 1,973 14.1%  3,049 21.7% 
Neither 3,834 27.3%  2,629 18.8% 
Total 14,037 100%  14,037 100.0% 
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pattern might be the existence of dual holder firms within the same company, a characteristic 
which has gained increased relevance in the few recent decades (Yang, 2017). 
Figure 1: Debt and equity issuance by rating 
Percentage of firm-years by rating that have a debt offering only (Panel A) or an equity offering only 
(Panel B), from 2001 to 2017. The sample consists in all Compustat firms with a credit rating at the 
beginning of the year, excluding financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in 
the fields regularly required and with a very large offering. A large offering is defined as an offering 
greater than 10% of total assets for the calendar year 
Panel A. Debt issuance, 2001 to 2017 
 
% of firm-years with debt issuance only 
 
Panel B. Equity issuance, 2001 to 2017 
 













































































Figure 1 shows debt and equity offerings by rating, while Figure 2 illustrates average NetDIss 
by rating. 
For debt offerings, firms within the broad ratings AA, BB and B, and near a change in rating, 
raised less debt than firms farther from a rating change. For equity offering, firms within the 
broad AA and BB ratings and with a downgrade potential, issued more equity relative to firms 
with no downgrade or upgrade potential. Moreover, firms within the broad rating B and with 
an upgrade potential, issued more equity than firms with no downgrade or upgrade potential.  
Within the same broad rating, firms with a downgrade potential have a lower average NetDIss 
when compared to firms with no downgrade or upgrade potential. This pattern is present in five 
of the six broad ratings categories analyzed in our work. Although the average NetDIss is nearly 
constant across all broad ratings, firms with a higher credit quality raised more debt and less 
equity than firms with a lower credit quality. Conversely to Kisgen (2006)’s findings which 
clearly support the CR-CS hypothesis, these results suggest that the evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis is quite weak. The stricter results shown in Kisgen (2006) (see Appendix I) are 
driven by a strong negative linear relationship between broad ratings and average NetDIss 
which appears in the author´s computed sample.  
Figure 2: Average NetDIss by rating 
This figure illustrates the mean value of NetDIss, (DDi,t - DEi,t) /Ai,t , by rating from 2001 to 2017 across 
firm-years. The sample consists in all Compustat firms with a credit rating at the beginning of the year, 
excluding financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly 
required and with a very large offering (greater than 10% of total assets). 
 












































Before a more comprehensive regression analysis, we performed a correlation analysis in order 
to understand the relationship between our variables and the expected response. The paragraphs 
below will provide insight only into the relationships between variables within the sample 
which excludes solely large debt offering and financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999).  
By analyzing the correlation matrix provided in Appendix II, one can observe that the resulting 
correlation coefficients in absolute value vary in range between 0.0020 and 0.4391, verifying 
either a no linear or a weak association. The correlation coefficients between CRPom and 
NetDIss, and CRMinus and NetDIss, are negative, thereby offering support to the validity of the 
CR-CS hypothesis. The negative coefficient in these cases suggests that firms near a potential 
change in credit rating will typically issue less debt relative to equity, compared to firms not 
near a change in rating. The correlation coefficient between CRPlus and NetDIss however, was 
positive, directly contradicting the CR-CS hypothesis.  
Appendix III presents the correlation matrix for the Credit Score Test. The resulting correlation 
coefficients in absolute value are kept in a tight range within the POM test results. In this 
particular case however, the correlation coefficient between CRlow and NetDIss returned the 
sole negative value in support of the CR-CS hypothesis. Although some dummy coefficients 
were negative, the existence of positive dummy coefficients imposes a less strict negative linear 
relationship between firms near a credit rating and average NetDIss, than firms not near a credit 
rating change, compared to what is expected given Kisgen (2006)’s findings. The correlation 
matrixes’ analysis presents the same pattern as the one illustrated in the figures above.  
Therefore, our subsequent work was undertaken with the expectation that compared to Kisgen 
(2006)’s results, our empirical tests would present weakened evidence in favor of the CR-CS 
hypothesis. 
5. Credit rating impact on capital structure decision-POM tests  
This section addresses potential changes in Broad Rating through the use of POM tests. Under 
the CR-CS hypothesis, firms with a minus or plus designation will issue less debt relative to 
equity than firms without such a designation. In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, the 
following three regressions were considered:  
NetDIssit= a + b0CRPOM + fKit + eit                                                                                           (1)    
NetDIssit=a + b1CRPlus+  b2CRMinus + fKit + eit                                                                           (2) 
 16 
NetDIssit= a+ b3CRPOM +eit                                                                                                     (3)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Equation 3 only tests the impact of the proximity of a firm to an upgrade or a downgrade in 
their credit rating on its net debt relative to net equity issuance, while Equation 1, on top of that, 
controls for firm specific factors. Equation 2 not only tests the impact of the proximity of a firm 
to an upgrade or a downgrade in their credit rating on its net debt relative to net equity issuance, 
but also determines whether firms are more sensitive to a potential upgrade or downgrade. 
Table III:  Influence of credit rating - POM Test 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control variables. CRPOM is a 
credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year either a plus or a minus 
credit rating and 0 otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if a firm 
has at the beginning of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of 
shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets 
and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and 
excludes financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly 
required and with a very large offering (greater than 10% of total assets). Errors are White´s consistent 
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Adj.R2 0.0856 0.0857 0.0008  0.0854  0.0857 0.0012 
N 9,492 9,492 9,516  9,349 9,349 9,372 
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According to the CR-CS hypothesis, firms near a rating change will have more conservative 
debt financing policies than firms farther from such a change. Hence, under the validity of the 
CR-CS hypothesis βi < 0, i = 0, 1, 2, 3. The null hypothesis here is that βi ≥ 0. Results of the 
equations 1, 2 and 3 are provided in Table III, with panel A excluding large debt offerings and 
panel B excluding both large debt and equity offerings.  
Analyzing the results obtained in regressions 1 and 3, the exclusion of both solely large debt 
offerings or large debt and equity offerings, provides support for the CR-CS hypothesis, with a 
significant rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level. As predicted by the CR-CS 
hypothesis, the coefficients for all our dummy variables are negative. The values for 
coefficients associated to CRPOM after controlling for firm-specific factors, β0, indicate that 
firms with a plus or minus rating issue approximately 0.3% less debt annually relative to equity 
as a percentage of total assets than firms without plus or minus ratings. As a robustness check, 
we included sample financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999) in our sample, with the subsequent 
results remaining practically unchanged (see Appendix IV). Kisgen (2006)’s findings were of 
a larger magnitude, suggesting that firms on the edge of a broad rating change issue 
approximately 1% less debt relative to equity as a percentage of total assets than firms in the 
middle. This weaker evidence in support of the CR-CS model is likely to be driven by the less 
strict relationship between dummy variables and NetDIss present in our sample. 
Equation 2 assesses whether a firm is more sensitive to a credit rating downgrade or upgrade. 
In both panels A and B of Table III, the dummy variable coefficients, CRPlus and CRMinus are 
negative, as predicted by the CR-CS hypothesis. The coefficients for our minus dummies are 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level. These results suggest that firms near a 
downgrade credit rating issue nearly 0.4% less debt net of equity as a percentage of assets than 
firms farther from a change in rating. In both panels however, the plus dummy variable is not 
different from zero at a statistically significant level. Therefore, suggesting that firms near a 
rating upgrade do not seem to adapt their debt issuing patterns.  
A potential complication in the mechanism on the impact of credit ratings on capital structure 





Table IV: Influence of credit rating- POM coefficients by year 
Coefficients and standard errors from cross-section regressions of debt net of equity as a percentage of 
total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control variables. CRPOM is a credit rating dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year either a plus or a minus credit rating and 0 
otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning 
of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively and 0 otherwise. Regression 1 includes the CRPOM 
dummy variable and control variables and Regression 2 includes the CRPlus and CRMinus credit rating 
dummy variables and control variables. The control variables (not shown) are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), 
book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, 
EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log 
of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and excludes financial firms (SIC code 
4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a large debt offering 
(greater than 10% of total assets). Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Our results show that for 12 out of the 17 individual years in our sample, firms possess a 
negative POM dummy coefficient as compliant with the CR-CS hypothesis. Only in 3 out of 
those 17 individual years however, the CRPOM coefficient is statistically different from zero at 
the 10% significance level. In 2003, firms near a credit rating change issue 0.9% less debt net 
of equity as a percentage of assets than firms farther from a rating change. In 2006 and 2008, 
firms near a credit ratings change issue approximately 1.4% less debt net of equity as a 
percentage of assets, than firms far from a rating change. Moreover, in 12 out of our 17 
individual years, firms possess a negative coefficient for our plus dummy variable. However, 
for our 2006 and 2008 years, this coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. In both 
years, firms with an upgrade potential issue nearly 1.7% less debt relative to equity than firms 
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in the middle. For 13 out of 17 individual years in our sample, firms return a negative coefficient 
for our minus dummy variable. For our 2003 and 2005 years however, this coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In 2003 and 2005, firms near a credit rating downgrade 
issue around 1% and 1.7%, respectively, less debt net of equity than firms farther from a credit 
ratings change. 
The lack of significance of coefficients in most of the yearly results hinders our ability to draw 
conclusions on an annual basis. Therefore, in order to gain insight on whether the impact of 
credit ratings on capital structure was related with events that arose during 2001 and 2017, we 
split the data into three distinct periods: pre-financial crisis, financial crisis, post- financial 
crisis.  
Table V:  Influence of credit rating - POM coefficients by period 
Coefficients and standard errors from cross-section regressions of debt net of equity as a percentage of 
total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control variables. CRPOM is a credit rating dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year either a plus or a minus credit rating and 0 
otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning 
of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively and 0 otherwise. Regression 1 includes the CRPOM 
dummy variable and control variables and Regression 2 includes the CRPlus and CRMinus credit rating 
dummy variables and control variables. The control variables (not shown) are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), 
book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, 
EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log 
of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and excludes financial firms (SIC code 
4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a large debt offering 
(greater than 10% of total assets). Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
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Results on the analysis of this revised structure are shown in Table V.   
In both Period 1 and 2, our pre-crisis and crisis period respectively, firms possess a negative 
POM dummy coefficient in support of the CR-CS hypothesis. Moreover, in both periods this 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. In period 1, firms near a credit rating 
change issue approximately 0.4% less debt net of equity than firms far from a change in their 
credit rating. In period 2, firms on the edge of a broad rating issue nearly 0.6% less debt net of 
equity, than firms in the middle of a broad rating. A potential explanation for the broader impact 
of credit ratings on capital structure decision during periods of crisis might be related with a 
downward trend present in companies’ debt ratios levels during the financial crisis.  
Equation 2 in Table V shows the POM dummy coefficient split into its two components: plus, 
and minus, dummy coefficients. For period 1 and 2, coefficients are negative for both our plus 
and minus dummy variables, thereby agreeing with the CR-CS hypothesis. However, in the pre-
crisis period only CRMinus is statistically significant at a level of 5%, and in the crisis period 
only CRPlus is statistically significant at the 10% level. In this case, and contrary to the pattern 
verified when considered our entire time frame, firms near a rating upgrade seem to adapt their 
debt issuing patterns.  
Regarding the post-crisis period, the CRPOM coefficient is positive and consequently non 
statistically significant at all conventional levels. Moreover, the coefficient values for both our 
plus and minus dummy variables are also non statistically significant at all conventional levels. 
Therefore, period 3 does not support the CR-CS hypothesis. These particular coefficient values 
are likely to be biased, the post-crisis period saw an increase in the conservatism of rating 
agencies, which in itself affected several additional firm-specific factors which we are not 
accounting for in our empirical tests (e.g., Bagahi, Servaes and Tamayo, 2014). This 
phenomenon has been discussed in the literature, with Balakrishnan, Watts, and Zuo (2016) 
finding evidence that conservatism reduces “underinvestment in the presence of information 
frictions”. Furthermore, according to Francis, Hasan and Wu (2013), in post-crisis periods the 
increase in conservatism leads to more efficient governance mechanisms.  
The empirical tests performed in this section controlled for the financial condition of a firm (by 
including leverage, profitability and size as control variables) in order to capture the effect of 
credit rating in a manner distinct from an analysis of financial distress levels. This is done to 
mitigate any possible concerns that our results might be driven by financial distress arguments. 
Within firms with an upgrade potential, our results clearly distinguished between credit rating 
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effects and simple financial distress, particularly since both mechanisms would have opposite 
implications for such tests. For instance, firms near an upgrade are likely to be of a higher credit 
quality and so have lower probabilities of default.  
6. Credit rating impact on capital structure decisions- Credit Score tests  
This section examines potential changes of any kind in credit ratings using Altman´s Z-Score. 
To distinguish between firms near a credit rating change, we calculated the Altman´s Z-Score 
for each firm, and then preceded to rank firms within each micro rating into high thirds, middle 
thirds and low thirds. Within a micro rating, a firm in the high third is considered to be with an 
upgrade credit rating, while a firm in the low third is considered to be with a downgrade credit 
rating.  
The Altman´s Z-Score was derived by Edward Altman in 1968, and was the first model able to 
predict defaults by relying on five separate accounting ratios through discriminant analysis:  
X1= Working Capital / Total Assets  
X2= Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3= Earnings before interest and taxes / Total Assets 
X4= Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities 
X5= Sales / Total Assets  
The original Altman´s Z-Score model was designed for the analysis of publicly traded U.S 
manufacturing companies. We chose to use the original version of the model, illustrated in 
equation 4. For the purposes of our work however, we applied this model to both public 
manufacturing companies and non-manufacturing companies, following the same approach as 
other authors within the literature (e.g., Altman et al, 2017).  
In order to distinguish between firms near credit ratings changes within our model choice we 
applied the following logic: the lower (higher) the Altman´s Z-Score of a firm, the higher 
(lower) the likelihood of the firm to default, and consequently, the higher (lower) the probability 
of a firm’s credit rating being downgraded.  
Z-Score=1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.99X5                                                                                  (4) 
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Under the CR-CS hypothesis, firms that are placed in the high or low thirds of a given micro 
rating will issue less debt relative to equity than firms placed in the middle third.  To test the 
validity of this hypothesis, the following equations were considered:  
NetDIssit= a + b0CRHOL + fKit + eit                                                                                               (5)    
NetDIssit=a + b1CRHigh+ b2CRLow + fKit + eit                                                                                     (6) 
NetDIssit= a + b3CRHOL + eit                                                                                                                (7)  
These equations, similar to the ones presented in the section above,  not only test the impact of 
a firm’s proximity to a micro rating change, on its net debt relative to net equity issuance, but 
also determine whether firms are more sensitive to changes in the low third versus the high 
third.  
The accounting ratios used to calculate firms’ Z-Scores assessed several firm-specific 
fundamentals. The components of equation 4 are highly related to a firm’s financial conditions. 
One must bear in mind the fact that a firm with a relatively worse financial condition issues on 
average less debt compared to equity. Such a correlation is likely to generate a negative 
coefficient for our low third dummy variable and a positive coefficient for our high third 
dummy variable, regardless of other credit rating effects. To offset this, we merged both our 
high third and low third within a dummy variable (equation 5 and 7). Similarly to our POM 
tests, CR-CS predicts that bi<0, for i=0,1,2,3. An alternative approach for mitigating the effects 
of a firm’s financial condition on our tests is the inclusion of control variables, as reported 
within our methodology section.  
A potential multicollinearity problem is likely to arise however, as the control variables in our 
regression are similar to some of the variables used in Altman´s Z-Score calculation. 
Nevertheless, our control variables returned a linear relationship with both the dummy variables 
and the dependent variable. The variables considered within our Z-Score calculation appeared 
only indirectly in the regression, as they covered only our dummy variables (this being by 




Table VI: Influence of credit rating - Credit Score Test 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on both credit rating dummy variables and control variables. CRHOL is a 
credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high or low thirds of a given micro 
rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score and 0 otherwise. CRHigh and CRLow are credit rating dummy 
variables equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high or low thirds of a given micro rating with respect to 
its Altman Z-Score, respectively and 0 otherwise. The control variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book 
value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, 
EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log 
of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and excludes financial firms (SIC code 
4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a very large offering 
(greater than 10% of total assets). Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
An analysis of panel A of Table VI shows results contradicting the CR-CS hypothesis, with 
positive coefficients for all dummy variables and hence, a failure to rejection the null hypothesis 
at all conventional statistical levels. A potential explanation for these biased results, might rely 
on the fact that relatively high Z-Scores invariably impose distortions on the regression 
analyses.   
 
 Panel A: Non-truncating  Panel B: Truncating firms with Score>4.5 










































































Adj.R2 0.1058 0.1068 0.0016  0.1051 0.1141 0.0001 
N 6,734 6,734 6,734  6,734 6,734 6,734 
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Since the Altman´s Z- Score model has shown itself to not be wholly accurate when applied to 
our entire sample, we decided to impose a maximum ceiling for Altman´s Z-Score, capping the 
maximum Z-Score attainable by a firm at a ceiling value of 4.5 1. 
Through this truncation of the best credit quality companies, we obtained the results shown in 
panel B of Table VI. These results also do not support the CR-CS hypothesis when jointly 
analyzing the potential change in micro rating, with a non-rejection of the null at all 
conventional levels. This analysis underwent a robustness check with the inclusion of financial 
firms with the subsequent results remaining practically unchanged (see Appendix V). The lack 
of significance of the joint dummy coefficients might be explained by the effect of the strong 
correlation between accounting ratios in equation 4, and the financial conditions of the firm (as 
explained above). After the truncation of the best credit quality companies, the effect of this 
last factor in particular can be orders of magnitude larger than that of a credit ratings change.  
Equation 6 addresses whether firms are more sensitive to changes while in the low third versus 
being in the high third. The coefficient for our dummy variable CRLow, is negative as predicted 
by CR-CS hypothesis, being statistically different from zero at the 5% level. The results suggest 
that firms near a micro ratings downgrade issue, approximately, 0.6% less debt net of equity as 
a percentage of assets than firms that are in the middle third. The size of the coefficient is closer 
to the one obtained in our POM tests, although in this case the coefficient incorporates any 
potential ratings change. These results are nearly the same after including financial firms (SIC 
code 4000-4999) as a robustness check.  
The size of offerings should be of a smaller scale than for our POM tests. Thereby when 
undertaking small offerings, firms in the high or low third could expect an upgrade or a 
downgrade, while firms in the middle third would not face an upgrade or downgrade, when 
dealing with an offering of that size. To address this issue, our empirical tests implemented an 
offering cutoff point of 5%, with subsequent results shown in Appendix VI. Our results were 
nearly unchanged by this cutoff adjustment.  
To our knowledge, in the aftermath of Kisgen (2006), despite widespread adaptations of the 
author’s methodology, much of the literature takes only the POM tests regressions into account 
 




(e.g., Kemper and Rao, 2013). The non-consideration of credit scores in further analysis might 
be related with the lack of accuracy of such tests when applied to other samples and to updated 
time frames. Therefore, since credit score tests may appear to not fit within our sample, we will 
not consider them in the following sections. 
7. Credit rating impact on capital structure decisions by broad rating  
Table VII displays results for our entire sample by broad rating category in our POM tests, 
illustrating whether credit rating effects persist throughout broad rating categories. As discussed 
in the data and summary statistics section, the number of firm-years within a rating category 
varies considerably. An issue is likely to arise from this, since the power of these tests is reduced 
with decreased sample sizes.  
Table VII:  Influence of Credit Rating by broad rating 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions by broad rating of 
debt net of equity as a percentage of total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control 
variables. CRPOM is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year 
either a plus or a minus credit rating and 0 otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy 
variables equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively 
and 0 otherwise. The control variables (not shown) are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided 
by book value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of 
the year EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample 
covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and excludes financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years 
with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a large debt offering (greater than 10% of 
total assets). Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
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The results for both tests when considering our entire sample, suggest that the coefficients of 
the combined dummies have the correct value in 3 out of 6 rating categories, but in none of our 
rating categories is this coefficient statistically significant at all conventional levels. However, 
in 4 out of 6 rating categories, the minus dummy variable coefficients are negative, with 3 of 
them being statistically significant at least at the 10% level, thereby supporting the CR-CS 
hypothesis. Regarding our plus dummy variable coefficients, 2 out of 6 return negative values, 
but none of them are statically significant at all conventional levels. Therefore, across some 
broad rating categories, the impact of the credit rating mechanism seems to persist, although 
only within firms near a rating downgrade.  
Commercial paper is a flexible source of short-term financing and is typically used as an 
alternative to bank loans. The commercial paper market uses short-term credit quality ratings 
to assess a firm´s ability to enter the market. According to Standard & Poor´s terminology, the 
short-term credit quality rating is ranked within three rating categories: A1, A2, A3 or lower, 
which correspond to a long-term credit rating of A, BBB and B or lower. Our results within the 
A and BBB broad rating levels suggest the existence of concern within firms over commercial 
paper access. Firms at A and BBB rating levels might be worried with losing an A1 commercial 
paper rating or losing an A2 commercial paper rating, respectively. Moreover, our POM test 
results suggest that BB rated firms are particularly concerned with losing investment grade 
status.  
According to several authors within the literature, concern over credit ratings should be most 
prominent for firms with a rating between investment grade to speculative grade (i.e., from 
BBB- to BB+). The worry for such firms is that even since a small change in credit rating can 
have a significant impact on financing and investing decisions. Therefore, to explore this issue, 
we created an additional variable, CRIG/SG, defined in two ways: firms with a rating of BBB− 
or BB+, and firms with a rating of BBB, BBB−, BB+, or BB.  
For the purpose of analyzing this new variable, the following empirical tests were considered:  
NetDIssit= a + dCRIG/SG + fKit + eit                                                                                                        (8) 
NetDIssit= a + dCRIG/SG + bCRPOM+fKit + eit                                                                                                                     (9) 
The results for these empirical tests are illustrated in panels A and B of Table VIII. Regarding 
our first analysis, coefficients for our CRIG/SG variable are positive and non-statistically 
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significant at all conventional levels. For the second of our tests, and for both regressions we 
performed, coefficient values for our CRIG/SG variable are negative, with none returning 
statistically significant values at any conventional levels. Conversely, the POM dummy 
coefficients for both panels are statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient 
values obtained under these analyses are similar to those obtained in our POM test section. Our 
results support the CR-CS hypothesis. They also suggest however, that the impact of credit 
ratings on capital structure decisions is not amplified by the change from investment grade to 
speculative grade rating. 
Table VIII: Influence of credit rating -Investment Grade to Speculative Grade 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control variables. CRPOM is a 
credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year either a plus or a minus 
credit rating and 0 otherwise. CRIG/SG is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a rating 
of BBB- or BB+ in panel A or BBB, BBB-, BB+, and BB in panel B, and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of 
shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets 
and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and 
excludes financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly 
required and with a large debt offering (greater than 10% of total assets). Errors are White´s consistent 




 Panel A: BBB- and BB+  Panel B: BBB, BBB-, BB+ and BBB 


























































Adj.R2 0.0859 0.0873  0.0853 0.0857 
N 9,492 9,492  9,492 9,492 
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8. CR-CS model within the context of capital structure theories  
This section assesses the validity of the CR-CS hypothesis within the context of pecking order 
and trade-off theories, through the application of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)’s test, 
henceforth referred to in this section as the SSM test.  
A. Pecking Order Theory 
The SSM test states that if a firm has a deficit in funds (DEF) larger than what it is internally 
able to generate, the deficit will be made up through an issuance of debt rather than equity. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)’s DEF is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, dividend 
payments, the net increase in working capital, and the beginning of the year-current portion of 
long-term debt, minus operating cashflows after interest and taxes.  
To determine whether credit rating effects persist in the context of pecking order theory through 
POM tests, the following regression is applied:  
DLTDit/Ait= a + bDEFit/Ait +  b0CRPOM+ eit                                                                            (10)                                                                                           
Pecking order theory suggests that “a” is close to 0 and “b” is close to 1. If the pecking order 
model is correct and credit ratings effects are relevant within the context of this theory, then the 
b0 coefficient should be smaller than 0. The null hypothesis in this case is that b0 ³ 0. Our 
empirical tests comprise of the sample used in the sections above, with the exclusion of financial 
firms and utilities (SIC code 4000-4999, 6000-6999), firm-years for which DEF is missing, and 
large offerings. The results of our subsequent analysis are shown in panel A, Table IX. The 
values we obtained for our DEF coefficients, although positive, are not statistically significant 
at all conventional levels, suggesting therefore that the pecking order theory is not valid within 
our sample. Our POM dummy variable, on the other hand, returns a negative coefficient with 
statistical significance at the 5% level, supporting the CR-CS hypothesis. The size of this 
coefficient is slightly larger when compared to the coefficients obtained from our POM tests 
section. In this case, firms close to a credit rating change issue approximately 0.4% less debt 
net of equity than firms far from a credit rating change.  
B. Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory implies that, except to revert back to its target leverage, leverage should 
be constant across years, regardless of a firm being near a change in credit rating or not. This is 
contingent both the company´s marginal tax rate and distress cost remaining constant. 
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Proceeding as above, the following regression is considered in order to determine whether 
concerns regarding credit rating effects hold within the context of trade-off theory, through the 
use of POM tests:  
DLTDit/Ait= a + b(LTD´-LTDit)/Ait +  b0CRPOM+ eit                                                                               (11)                                                                                                                                     
The firm´s target long term debt level is defined as LTD´, with a particular challenge in the 
application of these tests being that LTD´ is not observed. Following Taggart (1997)’s 
approach, which is also the main approach used by SSM, the target debt level estimate of a 
particular year is determined by taking the debt ratio average for each firm for the entire sample 
period and multiplying that average by the firm-beginning of years´ total capital. 
Assuming the validity of the trade-off theory, “b” will be greater than 0 and less than 1 (this 
maximum ceiling for “b” is imposed by transaction costs being associated with changing capital 
levels). According to the CR-CS hypothesis, regardless of a firm being currently below or above 
their target level, firms with an upgrade or a downgrade potential might be not only less willing 
to increase their debt levels, but also more prone to reduce their debt. Conversely, firms in the 
middle will likely increase their debt levels if they are below their target debt level, since they 
are typically less concerned with a potential change in credit rating. Hence, if the model is 
accurate and credit ratings effects do matter for the context of this theory, “a” should be close 
to 0, “b” should be close to 1, and the b0 coefficient value should be smaller than 0. Our null 
hypothesis here is that b0 ³ 0. The empirical tests use the same sample as our sections above, 
while excluding financial firms and utilities (SIC code 4000-4999, 6000-6999), and firm-years 
where large offerings are present. Results for these tests are shown in panel B, Table IX.  
The SSM variable returns a negative coefficient while being non-statistically significant at all 
conventional levels, thereby violating the trade-off theory. Concurrent with our results above 
however, the CR-CS hypothesis remains valid. Both theories are violated when applied to our 
computed sample. Therefore, it is not possible to draw any kind of conclusions on whether CR-
CS hypothesis can be used as a complement to the pecking order or trade-off theories. 




Table IX: SSM Tests of Pecking-order and Trade-off theories incorporating rating 
concerns 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on DEF or (LTD′ − LTD). CRPOM 
is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year either a plus or a 
minus credit rating and 0 otherwise. DEF and (LTD′ − LTD) are defined as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999): DEF is capital expenditures plus dividend payments plus net increase in working capital and the 
current portion of long-term debt minus operating cash flows after interest and taxes, and (LTD′ − LTD) 
is target debt level minus current debt level divided by total assets. The sample covers firm-years from 
2001 to 2017 and excludes financial firms and utilities (SIC code 4000-4999, 6000-6999) and firm-years 
with missing data in the fields regularly required. The sample also excludes a firm-year that has a debt 
offering greater than 10% of total assets in the year or if the SSM variable is greater than 30% of total 
assets for that particular year. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
9. Conclusions and further research 
Managers in contemporary times appear to consider credit ratings as a significant determinant 
of a firm´s capital structure policy, due to the potential frictions associated with ratings changes 
(Kisgen, 2006). Therefore, this thesis intends to examine whether credit ratings have a direct 
impact on capital structure decisions in firms in the U.S.   
Our own analysis concurred with Kisgen’s (2006) findings that firms with a plus or minus 
designation are likely to withhold debt issuing, in a manner consistent with the predictions of 
the CR-CS hypothesis. However, when firms are ranked within each micro rating into high 
thirds, middle thirds and low thirds based on their Altman’s Z-Score, the CR-CS hypothesis 
        
 Panel A: Pecking Order Theory  Panel B: Tradeoff Theory 

















    












Adj.R2 0.0034 0.0008 0.0043  0.0098 0.0002 0.0101 
N 5,218 5,218 5,218  7,227 7,227 7,227 
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does not hold. Therefore, empirical tests are only significant by broad rating results, with firms 
on the edge of a broad rating change issuing approximately 0.3% less debt relative to equity as 
a percentage of total assets annually than firms in the middle. Moreover, our results also suggest 
that the significance of the joint dummy variable coefficient is likely to be driven mainly by the 
minus dummy variable coefficient. Therefore, firms’ proximity to a credit rating upgrade appear 
to not directly impact capital structure decisions.  
Furthermore, we find that not only did the CR-CS hypothesis not hold across the entire sample 
period, but also that the impact of this hypothesis varies largely within different timeframes. 
We find significant effects for credit ratings on capital structures in the pre-crisis and crisis 
period, with an impact 0.20% points larger in magnitude on capital structure decisions in the 
crisis period, when compared to the pre-crisis period.  
Our empirical tests by rating demonstrate, on the one hand, that firms are typically most 
concerned when positioned within broad rating levels in which access to the commercial paper 
is affected. These tests further suggest that the impact of credit ratings on capital structure 
decisions is not amplified around the change from investment grade to speculative grade rating. 
This particular finding contradicts much of the literature, which assumes that concern regarding 
credit ratings should be most prominent around the change from an investment grade to a 
speculative grade rating. Our findings are consistent with Kemper and Rao (2013)’s work, with 
their claim that firms, contrary to general expectations, do not change their debt issuance 
patterns to obtain investment grade ratings.  
Our sample violates both the pecking order and trade-off theories, and thus conversely to 
Kisgen (2006)’s findings, we cannot accurately assess whether the CR-CS hypothesis can be 
relied upon to complement these theories.  
Overall, one can conclude that the potential costs of downgrades directly impact capital 
structure decisions, and so managers are likely to remain concerned with ratings-triggered costs. 
Credit ratings are therefore considered to be an important factor when making capital structure 
decisions. 
Future streams of research in this field would benefit from focusing on the impact of credit 
ratings on capital structure decisions. Firstly, such a focus would ensure correct inferences in 
empirical tests of capital structures. Secondly, it would provide a more comprehensive 
depiction of capital structure behavior. Thirdly, it would be worthwhile to further investigate 
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the impact of credit ratings on capital structure decisions within a broader and larger sample, 
composed by rated firms based in countries with different financial orientations. Finally, it 
would be interesting for forthcoming research to examine the impact of the CR-CS hypothesis 
within the context of sovereign debt impairment, since sovereign ratings affect a firms ´capital 
structure policy. Firms whose rating is equal to or above their sovereign before the downgrade 
may find it more expensive to raise debt in the aftermath of a sovereign downgrade, thereby 
being tempted to replace debt with equity and reduce investment (Almeida et al., 2017). Such 
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11. Appendix  
Appendix  I: Capital market activity by rating- Kisgen (2006, p.1051) 
This figure illustrates the mean value of NetDIss, (DDi,t - DEi,t) /Ai,t , by rating from 1986 to 2001 across 
firm-years. The sample consists in all Compustat firms with a credit rating at the beginning of the year, 
excluding firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a very large offering. 
 
 













Appendix  II: Correlation Matrix excluding large debt offering- Plus or Minus Test 
This figure illustrates the correlation matrix of NetDIss, CRPOM, CRPlus, CRMinus and control variables, 
from 2001 to 2017. CRPOM is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of 
the year either a plus or a minus credit rating and 0 otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy 
variables equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively 
and 0 otherwise. The control variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book 
value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year 
EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample consists 
in all Compustat firms with a credit rating at the beginning of the year, excluding firm-years with missing 
data in the fields regularly required and with a very large offering. A large offering is defined as an 




Appendix  III: Correlation Matrix excluding large debt offering- Credit Score Test 
This figure illustrates the correlation matrix of NetDIss, CRHOL, CRHigh, CRLow and control variables, 
from 2001 to 2017. CRHOL is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high 
or low thirds of a given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score and 0 otherwise. CRHigh and 
CRLow are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high or low thirds of a 
given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score, respectively and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of 
shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets 
and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample consists in all Compustat firms with a 
credit rating at the beginning of the year, excluding firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly 
required and with a very large offering. A large offering is defined as an offering greater than 10% of 
total assets for the calendar year. 
 
 
 NetDIss CRPOM CRPlus CRMinus Leverage Profitability Size 
NetDIss 1       
CRPOM -0.0244 1      
CRPlus 0.0020 - 1     
CRMinus -0.0278 - -0.4391 1    
Leverage -0.0670 -0.0220 -0.0085 -0.0148 1   
Profitability 0.1678 -0.0098 0.0379 -0.0480 -0.0648 1  
Size 0.2327 -0.0421 0.0080 -0.0525 -0.0923 0.1882 1 
 
 NetDIss CRHOL CRHigh CRLow Leverage Profitability Size 
NetDIss 1       
CRHOL 0.0421 1      
CRHigh 0.1102 - 1     
CRLow -0.0857 - -0.4330 1    
Leverage -0.0636 -0.0551 -0.1240 0.0872 1   
Profitability 0.2198 0.0980 0.3756 -0.3472 -0.0751 1  
Size 0.2740 -0.0608 -0.0193 -0.0496 -0.0816 0.1954 1 
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Appendix  IV: Influence of credit rating - POM test 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on credit rating dummy variables and on control variables at the beginning 
of each year. CRPOM is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the 
year either a plus or a minus credit rating and 0 otherwise. CRPlus and CRMinus are credit rating dummy 
variables equal to 1 if a firm has at the beginning of the year a plus or a minus credit rating, respectively 
and 0 otherwise. The control variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book 
value of debt plus book value of shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year 
EBITDA divided by total assets and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample covers 
firm-years from 2001 to 2017 and excludes firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required 
and with a very large offering. A large offering is defined as an offering greater than 10% of total assets 
for the calendar year. Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance 












 Panel A: Excluding Large 
Debt Offerings 
 Panel B: Excluding Large Debt and 
Equity Offerings 










































































Adj.R2 0.0681 0.0681 0.0004  0.0649  0.0649 0.0005 
N 13,297 13,297 13,326  13,125 13,125 13,153 
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Appendix  V: Influence of credit rating - Credit score test 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on both credit rating dummy variables and control variables at the 
beginning of each year. CRHOL is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the 
high or low thirds of a given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score and 0 otherwise. CRHigh 
and CRLow are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high or low thirds of 
a given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score, respectively and 0 otherwise.  The control 
variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of 
shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets 
and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017 and 
excludes firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly required and with a very large offering. A 
large offering is defined as an offering greater than 10% of total assets for the calendar year. Errors are 













 Panel A: Non-truncating  Panel B: Truncating firms with Score>4.5 











































































Adj.R2 0.0878 0.0886 0.0007  0.0868 0.0967 0.0003 
N 8,781 8,781 8,781  8,781 8,781 8,781 
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Appendix  VI: Influence of credit rating - Credit score test 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section regressions of debt net of equity 
as a percentage of total assets on both credit rating dummy variables and control variables at the 
beginning of each year. CRHOL is a credit rating dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the 
high or low thirds of a given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score and 0 otherwise. CRHigh 
and CRLow are credit rating dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm is placed in the high or low thirds of 
a given micro rating with respect to its Altman Z-Score, respectively and 0 otherwise.  The control 
variables are:  Leverage, D/(D+E), book value of debt divided by book value of debt plus book value of 
shareholder´s equity, Profitability, EBITDA/A, beginning of the year EBITDA divided by total assets 
and, Size, ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales. The sample covers firm-years from 2001 to 2017, and 
excludes financial firms (SIC code 4000-4999), firm-years with missing data in the fields regularly 
required and with a large offering. A large offering is defined as an offering greater than 5% of total 
assets for the calendar year. Errors are White´s consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 




 Panel A: Non truncating  Panel B: Truncating firms with Score>4.5 






































































Adj.R2 0.1058 0.1072   0.1502 0.1156 0.0000 
N 5,194 5,194   5,194 5,194 5,194 
